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NOTE AND COMMENT

TAKING O EQUITABLE EASEMEMNTS O0 PUBLIC UsV.-The case of Flynn
v. New York &c Railway Co., decided by the Court of Appeals of New
York in April last, involves the right of an owner of land to which
is appurtenant a so-called equitable easement, arising under a covenant
restricting the use of other land, to compensation upon the taking of
the servient land for a public use inconsistent with the restriction. A tract
of land was laid out in accordance with a plan, and alL,.lots therein were
sold and conveyed by deeds containing covenants, inter alia, that, "No building or structure for any business purpose whatsoever shall be erected on
said premises." The appellant railway company purchased thirty-eight of
these lots from the grantees of the original owner, subject to the restrictions, and built its railway across them, partly on an embankment and partly
in a cut. Respondents owned lots in this tract, some adjacent to appellant's
lots, some across the street from them. The maintenance and operation of
the railway rendered respondents' property less valuable than it would be
if the appellant's property were used exclusively for residence purposes. The
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respondents sued to enjqin the construction and operation of the railway
-across appellant's lots. The judgment appealed from restrains the maintenance
of appellant's structures (the railway was completed and in operation before the trial), and the operation of the road,' unless appellant pays
respondents the certain sums which are assessed as damages, measured by
the dep'reciation in value which their lands sustain, not only by reason of
the existence of the appellant's structures but also by reason of the use
to which they are put. (As to the assessment of compensation in the
injunction suit, see Lwims,
MIN NT DOMAIN (3d." Ed.) § 892).
This
judgment is affirmed by a unanimous court. POUND, J., delivering the opinion,says, "These restrictive covenants create a property right and make direct
and compensational the damages which otherwise would be consequential
and non-compensational: No matter how unpleasant a neighbor the railroad
may prove, if it takes no property by physical appropriation it is not chargeable with damages for impaired values due only to proximity. But something
in the nature of an easement of privacy over another's land may be
acquired by covenant in order that one may live apart from the disagreeable
sights and sounds of business, if one desires, and if that right has a value
and the railroad subtracts a portion thereof by building on the restricted
land, it is difficult to conceive why compensation should not follow."
There have been other decisions of the same import, (See Long Eaton Co.
v. Midland Railway Co,. [i9o2] 2 K. B. 574; La'dd v. City of Boston, f5i
Mass. 585; Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464), but the case appears
to be of first impression in New York, and, as none of the foregoing cases
are cited by the court, the conclusion appears to have been reached by
independent reasoning.
The broad construction given in the principal case to the covenant that
no "building or ftructure" for business purposes "shall be erected on"
said premises, as prohibiting the construction of the railroad, "whether
above, on or below the surface of the ground," seems quite sound, and
is supported by Long Eaton Co. v. Midland Railway Co., supra. The case
of United States v. Certain Lands, 112 Fed. 662; affirmed in i53 Fed. 876,
cited in the principal case as suggesting a distinction between infringement
of a covenant by privdte act and infringement by public act, went off' finally
on the construction of the covenant prohibiting "noxious, dangerous or
offensive trade or business," as not inconsistent with the use of the land
for fortification and coast defense. Its only relation to the principal
case, then, is that they both involve nice questions of construction.
The principal case and those cited herein as in accord with it tend to
support the position that equitable rights in land are rights in rem. Like
the cases cited to that point by Mr. HusToN, in his ENFORCEMENT OF DlcRus IN EQUITY, they are not conclusive upon this point. The argument
proceeds upon the premise that, in order to be entitled to compensation, it
is essential that one have "real" rights in. the land which is physically
taken. But it may be said that this premise is unsound: that it is enough
that one receives an injury in respect of other land in which he has
such rights, against which he would have a remedy if it were the result
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of a private use. This position raises a large question upon which the
authorities are not in harmony, and upon which the phraseology of constitutions and statutes has an important bearing. Lxwis, EMINtNT DOMAIN,
§ § 62-68. The cases in New York, though not free from doubt, give much
support to the-narrow doctrine quoted above from the principal case. Story
v. N. Y. El. R. Co., go N. Y. 122; "Uline v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., IOI
N. Y. 98; Lahr v. Met. El. R. Co., io4 N. Y. 268. But, granting that the
broader position might have furnished adequate ground for these cases, the
theory upon which they were put by the courts which decided them is
that the covenantee had property rights in the land of the covenantor,
which are taken by a use inconsistent with the covenant. These cases thus
stand alongside of In re Nisbet and Port's Contract, [1905] I Ch. 391;
[i9o6] I Ch. 386, as establishing the "real" character of equitable easements. And, if it be conceded that these are rights in rem, it is extremely
difficult to differentiate any of the other equitable interests.
E. N. D.

HeinOnline -- 14 Mich. L. Rev. 661 1915-1916

